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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joseph Craig Newman (hereinafter "Newman") appeals from the district 
court's order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Underlving Criminal Proceedinss 
The facts of Newman's crime and the procedural history are set forth in 
State v. Newman, #25681 slip op. at 1-2 (Ct. App. April 16, 2002) (unpublished): 
At the time of the events giving rise to this case, Joseph 
Newman resided in a small house with his girlfriend, Karlene 
Newsom, Newman's two teenage boys and ten-year-old daughter, 
and Newsom's fifteen-year-old daughter. On July 27, 1998, a 
friend of Newman, Carmelita Shaw, asked Newman to take care of 
her three children while Shaw made a court appearance on a 
criminal charge. The Shaw children were a six-year-old girl, an 
eight-year-old boy, and eight-month-old Miranda. Ms. Shaw was 
arrested later that day because she did not make the scheduled 
court appearance. Consequently, the Shaw children remained in 
the care of Newman and Newsom. 
On August 23, 1998, at about 5:00 a.m., Newman checked 
on Miranda and found that she was not breathing. Newman began 
to perform CPR on Miranda while Newsom went to a nearby 
convenience store to telephone for an ambulance. The responding 
paramedics found that Miranda was not breathing and did not have 
a pulse. Medical efforts to revive her were unsuccessful. 
Physicians who attended Miranda found that she was bruised in 
many places and that her eyes showed retinal hemorrhaging, an 
indication of shaken baby syndrome. A pathologist who performed 
an autopsy determined that Miranda died from a severe blow to her 
head with a blunt object that fractured her skull and from internal 
bleeding in her brain consistent with shaken baby syndrome. 
Newman and Newsom were both charged with felony injury 
to a child, ldaho Code 9 18-1501(1). The State also sought a 
persistent violator sentence enhancement, I.C. $$ 19-2514, against 
Newman. Karlene Newsom pleaded guilty and received a unified 
ten-year sentence with a five-year determinate term. See State v. 
Newsom, 135 ldaho 89, 90, 14 P.3d 1083, 1084 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Newman proceeded to trial and was found guilty. He then admitted 
that he was subject to a persistent violator enhancement. The 
district court imposed on Newman a unified life sentence with a 
twenty-five-year minimum term. 
The court of appeals identified Newman's issues on appeal: 
On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the statute 
under which he was convicted, contends that there were errors in 
the admission of evidence at his trial, argues that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict, and contends that his 
sentence is excessive. 
Id. at 1. The appellate court affirmed Newman's judgment and sentence. at -
Statement of the Facts and Course of Post-Conviction Proceedinqs 
Newman subsequently filed a timely post-conviction petition alleging trial 
counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by 
failing to: 1) file a motion to disqualify the judge; 2) file a motion for new trial 
based on new evidence; 3) hire a defense pathologist; 4)  maintain contact and 
communication with Newman; and 5) effectively identify inconsistencies by a 
witness's trial testimony and his comments in the pre-sentence investigation 
report. (#29737 R., pp.2-6.) 
The state filed an answer (#29737 R., pp.35-37) and a motion to dismiss 
claiming Newman failed to provide evidence supporting his allegations (#29737 
R., pp.23-34). Newman filed a response claiming he possessed evidence 
supporting his allegations and that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel to 
properly present his claims. (#29737 R., pp.38-39.) The district court summarily 
dismissed Newman's petition (#29737 R., pp.40-42) and Newman timely 
appealed (#29737 R., pp.43-46). On appeal, Newman argued the district court 
erred in dismissing his petition without giving adequate notice of the grounds for 
dismissal and in denying his motion for appointment of counsel to assist him in 
his post-conviction proceeding. Newman v. State, 140 ldaho 491, 492, 95 P.3d 
642, 643 (Ct. App. 2004). The ldaho Court of Appeals determined the district 
court erred because "Newman has alleged at least some claims which possibly 
could be developed and supported with assistance of counsel to present a viable 
basis for relief." Id. at 494, 95 P.3d at 645. 
On remand the district court appointed counsel (#35568 R., pp.3-22) who 
filed an amended petition adding additional claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and clarifying Newman's past claims (#35568 R., pp.28-41). The state 
moved to dismiss. The district court granted that motion in part, but granted 
Newman an evidentiary hearing on three claims. (#35568 R., pp.78-92.) Those 
claims included Newman's claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to 1) 
move to disqualify Judge Woodland for bias, 2) hire a pathologist to assist in the 
defense of the case, and 3) communicate with Newman following his conviction. 
(#35568 R., pp.84-92.) 
Prior to the evidentiary hearing counsel for Newman filed a motion 
requesting the district court take judicial notice of twenty items, including 
documents from Newman's underlying criminal and post-conviction cases as well 
as filings and documents relating to his co-defendant, Ms. Newsom's case. 
(Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice, pp.2-3.') Newman also requested the 
court take judicial notice of documents in a proceeding before the professional 
conduct board of the ldaho State Bar involving Newman's trial counsel, Mr. 
Eckert. (Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice, pp.2-3.) 
The documents in the bar proceeding included an amended complaint 
alleging two counts of failing to respond to bar counsel in a disciplinary 
proceeding. (Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice, Exhibit J.) The basis of 
the complaint was that Mr. Eckert received multiple letters from the ldaho State 
Bar requesting him to communicate back to them and that Eckert "did not 
respond to that letter as requested" as required by ldaho Rule of Professional 
Conduct 8.l(b) and ldaho Bar Commission Rule 505(e). (Motion for Court to 
Take Judicial Notice, Exhibit J.) Newman also requested the court take judicial 
notice of the ldaho State Bar's Motion to Deem Admissions and for Imposition of 
Sanction, the ldaho Supreme Court's order to show good cause why sanctions 
should not be imposed and Mr. Eckert's response to that order wherein he 
admitted that he failed to communicate with bar officials as required by the rules. 
(Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice, Exhibits K, L, M.) 
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the district court heard argument on 
Newman's motion. The state objected to the district court taking judicial notice of 
six items: 1) Newman's original petition for post-conviction relief; 2) Newman's 
amended petition, including the attached exhibits; 3) Court Minute Order & Entry 
This document is attached to Appellant's "Motion to Augment the Record" dated 
April 9, 2009, an order granting the motion was issued on April 14, 2009. 
of April 7, 1999, regarding the sentencing of Karlene M. Newsom in Case No. 
CR-1998-493-FE; and 4) the documents before the board of professional 
conduct. (#35568 Tr., p.13, L.10 - p.14, L.1.) 
After hearing argument, the district court took judicial notice of all 
documents that were part of the post-conviction file including the amended 
petition: "The Court -- well, first of all, anything that's in this file, the post 
conviction relief file, is part of the record that I'm going to base my decision on to 
the extent that it's properly a matter of record at this hearing. Now, I'll take 
judicial notice of the fact that there isn't an original petition for post conviction, the 
fact that there's an amended petition which included exhibits." (#35568 Tr., p.22, 
Ls.16-25.) The court also took judicial notice of the minute order prepared with 
regard to the sentencing of Karlene M. Newsom. (#35568 Tr., p.25, Ls.10-13.) 
The court did not, however, take judicial notice of the documents relating to bar 
complaint against Mr. Eckert for failing to respond: 
I am not going to take judicial notice for the reason that on the 
record currently before me I do not have sufficient information to 
meet the requirements of Rule 201 sub (b) of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence in that the fact of such filings or the content of such filings 
are not matters that are generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of this trial court and are not capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to reach [sic] the sources of accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned on this record. So I'm not going 
to take judicial notice of that. 
I would note additionally that I think the relevance is fairly 
remote. I'm understanding that your argument is that because Mr. 
Eckert was disciplined for failing to respond to inquires from bar 
counsel regarding complaints that had been made against him with 
the bar counsel that that must somehow make it more likely that he 
did not respond to requests from Mr. Newman during the case that 
had happened some months if not years -- I'll check the exact date 
-- prior to the date of the bar counsel's letters to Mr. Eckert. I think 
that's pretty slim, but in any event I'm not going to take judicial 
notice of those items. 
(#35568 Tr., p.27, L.14 - p.28, L.13.) 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court issued a Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Petition for Post-Conviction Relief denying Newman's 
request to vacate the sentence and judgment of conviction. (#35568 R., p.99.) 
The district court made clear that it "reviewed the Petition and Affidavit for Post- 
Conviction Relief, the State's Answer, Petitioner's Response to Answer to 
Dismiss Post Conviction Relief, and Petitioner's Post Conviction Relief Petition 
Amendment and the Affidavits of Joseph Newman in Support, Petitioner's Motion 
for Court to Take Judicial Notice, the original file for Bannock County Case Cr- 
FE-1998-494-A, and accompanying transcripts" as well as the testimony 
presented at the hearing. (#35568 R., p.99.) 
Regarding Newman's claim that Mr. Eckert provided ineffective assistance 
of counsel in allowing Judge Woodland to preside over the trial, the district court 
concluded that the decision to not seek disqualification was strategic, that Mr. 
Eckert "accounted for the evidence and incidents that would provide cause to 
disqualify the court and weighed the chance of success against the danger of 
prejudicing the court." (#35568 R., p.117.) The district court found that Mr. 
Eckert "discussed the possibility of seeking disqualification with the prosecutor 
and Judge Woodland and determined that such a motion would be futile." 
(#35568 R., p.117.) The district court also reasoned that "[c]ounsel for 
Newman's co-defendant [Ms. Newsom] had similar concerns and decided not to 
seek disqualification for cause." (#35568 R., p.117.) The district court further 
concluded that Newman "did not present evidence of overt bias on the part of 
Judge Woodland to show that any part of the trial proceedings was prejudiced." 
(#35568 R., p.117.) 
With regard to Newman's claim that his attorney was ineffective for falling 
to hire a pathologist, the district court concluded that Mr. Eckert's "decision not to 
hire an independent pathologist was a strategic decision." (#35568 R., p.117.) 
The district court found that the two pathologists contacted by Mr. Eckert could 
not rebut the State's conclusions from the evidence and "would buttress the 
State's case" and that Mr. Eckert "provided effective representation in deciding 
not to hire an independent pathologist." (#35568 R., p.118.) 
On Newman's final claim, whether Mr. Eckert was ineffective for failing to 
communicate with Newman after trial about seeking a new trial, the district court 
determined that Mr. Eckert "sent Newman a letter agreeing to seek a new trial" 
but that Mr. "Eckert followed up on the alleged newly discovered evidence and 
could not find sufficient evidence to justify a request for a new trial." (#35568 R., 
p.118.) The court further concluded that Mr. Eckert's decision "not to file a 
Motion for New Trial is supported by facts and was not ineffective assistance of 
counsel." (#35568 R., p.118.) 
Accordingly, because the district court found in favor of the state on each 
of the three issues, the district court denied Newman's request for post- 
conviction relief. (#35568 R., p.119.) Newman timely appeals from that 
memorandum decision and order. (#35568 R., pp.121-24.) 
ISSUES 
Newman states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it failed to take judicial notice 
of the ldaho State Bar Professional Conduct Board's actions 
against Thomas Eckert and the ldaho Supreme Court's 
Order addressing the State Bar's proceeding against Mr. 
Eckert which were submitted to the district court? 
2 Did the district court err when it failed to properly take judicial 
notice of Mr. Newman's underlying criminal case and his 
post conviction action prior to the Court of Appeals remand? 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Did the district court properly exercise its discretion by not taking judicial 
notice of records that were not from the court file in the same or a 
separate case, where the accuracy and content of those documents were 
not capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 
whose accuracy could not be reasonably questioned, and where those 
documents and the content of those documents were irrelevant to the 
petitioner's claims? 
2. Did the district court review judicially noticed documents and pr'operly 
weigh and evaluate the contents of those judicially noticed documents? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Properlv Exercised Its Discretion Bv Not Takinq Judicial Notice 
Of Documents Of A Disciplinary Proceedinq That Were Irrelevant To This Case 
And That Did Not Meet The Requirements Of I.R.E. 201(b) 
A. Introduction 
Newman contends the district court erred in failing to take judicial notice of 
documents in a matter before the professional conduct board of the ldaho State 
Bar. (Appellant's Brief, p.1 I .) Newman's argument fails for three reasons. First, 
Newman fails to appreciate the court's discretion on matters of judicial notice and 
has cited no authority for his proposition that the district court was required to 
take judicial notice of matters of the documents at issue. Second, documents in 
matters before the professional conduct board do not meet the requirements of 
I.R.E. 201(b). Third, even if the filing of those documents or the content of those 
documents were the type of facts that a trial court could take judicial notice of, 
they were not facts relevant to the case at hand, and therefore, not admissible. 
B. I.R.E. 201 Does Not Require A Court To Take Judicial Notice Of 
Confidential Proceedinas Before The Professional Conduct Board Of The 
ldaho State Bar 
"Judicial notice is a mechanism enabling a judge to excuse the party 
having the burden of establishing a fact from producing formal proof of that fact." 
Brazier v. Brazier, 11 1 ldaho 692, 700, 726 P.2d 1143, 1151 (Ct. App. 1986). 
There are, however, limits to trial courts being able to excuse parties from laying 
traditional foundation. "A judicially noticed fact must be free from reasonable 
dispute because it is either I )  generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the trial court or 2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot readily be questioned." Id. (citing I.R.E. 201; 
Citv of Lewiston v. Frary, 91 ldaho 322,420 P.2d 805 (1966).) Pursuant to I.R.E. 
201(c), it is discretionary for the court to take judicial notice of evidence that 
meets these two requirements. Taking judicial notice is mandatory, however, 
only when a party requests "judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from 
the court file in fhe same or a separate case . . ." I.R.E. 201(c) (emphasis 
added) 
As a threshold mater, the documents submitted by Newman were not from 
the court file in the same or a separate case. Rather, the documents submitted 
by Newman relate to an action in front of the professional conduct board of the 
ldaho State Bar. As such, there is no court file and the proceedings do not 
constitute facts of which the district court is required to take judicial notice. As a 
result, the district court's decision to excuse Newman from making a formal offer 
of proof regarding these documents was entirely discretionary and, therefore, is 
not a basis for reversal.' 
Additionally, the contents of documents in an action before the board of 
professional conduct do not meet the two-fold requirements of I.R.E. 201(b). At 
the hearing on the issue of judicial notice, the state objected to the documents 
* It should be noted that there is no ldaho case where the court's failure to take 
judicial notice constituted reversible error. The decision to not take judicial notice 
merely precludes a defendant from the convenience of admitting evidence 
without laying foundation. The failure to take judicial notice does not preclude a 
defendant from laying the foundation and admitting the fact through other means. 
Newman has cited no authority for the proposition that a court's refusal to take 
judicial notice is a basis for reversible error. 
relating to the matter before the professional conduct board that concerned Mr. 
Eckert. Newman responded by arguing the contents of documents showed Mr. 
Eckert failed to follow reasonable instructions and that the documents were 
evidence that Mr. Eckert failed to follow Newman's instructions in his case. In 
response, the district court asked Newman if they met the requirements of I.R.E. 
201, specifically whether the documents were capable of accurate and ready 
determination: 
The Court: All right. How would you contend that these 
particular documents meet the requirements of Rule 201 of the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence which requires that a judicially [sic] notice 
of fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute and that it is 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or 
capable of accurate and rendered determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy can not reasonably be questioned? 
Mr. French: Your Honor, as far as our Rule 201 goes, I just 
direct the Court back to my comments earlier that these four 
documents are from the bar position. 
The Court: How do I know that? 
Mr. French: I think they're self-authenticating. 
The Court: How so? 
Mr. French: They're titled, they give a case number on 
them, they have signatures on them, they're file stamped. 
The Court: Do I have the right to go into the records of the 
bar counsel and go see what's there? 
Mr. French: No, Your Honor. Those documents are 
confidential in the nature of how they are stamped. They're 
stamped in. They're dated and -- 
The Court: All right. I'm not going to hear anything more 
on that then. . . . 
(#35568 Tr., p.21, L.2 - p.22, L.11.) Because of the confidential nature of 
proceedings and filings with the ldaho Bar, the filings and particularly the claims 
in those filings are not matters that can be readily determined. Consequently, to 
be introduced into evidence, it makes sense for district courts to require a formal 
offer of proof with requisite foundation 
Finally, it was not error for the district court to refuse to take judicial notice 
of documents in the professional conduct board proceeding because the filings in 
that case were not relevant to Newman's post-conviction claims. As argued by 
the state: 
I'll just make this argument for all (j), (k), (I), and (m), Your Honor. I 
don't think that's relevant here. 
The decision that was made in that case with the ldaho State 
Bar and the decision that was written by the ldaho Supreme Court 
specifically relates to Mr. Eckert's ethical violations based on him 
not responding to the ldaho State Bar. That decision has nothing to 
do with Mr. Newman's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
that specifically we're dealing with here today. None of that came 
up. It was for reasons not responding to letters sent to Mr. Eckert 
by the ldaho State Bar. I don't see how that's applicable here and 
would object to relevance on those grounds, Your Honor. 
(#35568 Tr., p.18, Ls.6-20.) Newman responded by arguing that the allegations 
in the proceeding were in essence I.R.E. 404(b) evidence -- evidence of prior bad 
acts: 
Mr. French: Well, I demonstrate, Your Honor, that Mr. 
Eckert failed to follow the instructions that were given to him by his 
client in this matter. Mr. Newman's complaining party gave 
instructions to Mr. Eckert during his representation. And so if I can 
direct the Court's attention to -- 
The Court: So you're basically saying that its prior 
subsequent [sic] bad acts. 
Mr. French: Yes. That would be correct. 
(#35568 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-10.) The district court, after hearing argument, 
substantially agreed with the state: 
I would note additionally that I think the relevance is fairly remote. 
I'm understanding that your argument is that because Mr. Eckert 
was disciplined for failing to respond to inquires from bar counsel 
regarding complaints that had been made against him with the bar 
counsel that he must somehow make it more likely that he did not 
respond to requests from Mr. Newman during the case that had 
happened some months if not years -- I'll check the exact date -- 
prior to the date of the bar counsel's letters to Mr. Eckert. I think 
that's pretty slim, but in any event I'm not going to take judicial 
notice of those items. 
The state's objection and the district court's assessments are correct. The 
bar complaint before the professional conduct board of the ldaho State Bar 
merely alleged Mr. Eckert was in violation of ldaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
8.l(b) ("Failure to Respond to Lawful Demand for Information from a Disciplinary 
Authority") and ldaho Bar Commission Rule 505(e) ("Failure to Respond to 
Disciplinary Authorities"). (See Motion to Augment the Record and Statement in 
Support Thereof, Exhibit J.) The subsequent order found Mr. Eckert in violation 
of those rules, and ordered him to explain why he failed to respond to bar 
counsel's inquiries. (See Motion to Augment the Record and Statement in 
Support Thereof, Exhibit L.) Mr. Eckert responded by admitting to his failure to 
respond to bar counsel. (See Motion to Augment the Record and Statement in 
Support Thereof, Exhibit M.) 
A failure to respond to inquires by the ldaho State Bar does not make a 
material issue of fact in Newman's post-conviction petition more or less likely. 
Mr. Eckert's failure to respond to the ldaho Bar does not make it more or less 
likely that he was ineffective for not disqualifying the judge for bias, that his 
decision to not hire a pathologist was any less strategic, or that he did not 
communicate with Newman following his conviction. Consequently, the filing of 
these documents was not relevant to the adjudication of Newsom's post- 
conviction claims and regardless of whether the documents were of the type of 
facts that a court could take judicial notice of -- per the facts of this case, they 
were facts that were irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible. 
In sum, the district court properly denied Newman's request that the court 
take judicial notice of the documents in the board of professional conduct 
proceedings. Judicial notice was not required and the documents did not meet 
the requirements of I.R.E. 201. Further, even if the court could take judicial 
notice of the documents, the documents were irrelevant to Newman's post- 
conviction claims and therefore not admissible as evidence. 
II. 
The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion By Evaluatinq And Giving 
Weight To Judicially Noticed Items 
Newman claims that although the district court "stated it was taking judicial 
notice of Mr. Newman's underlying criminal file, as well as his post conviction 
action prior to the Court of Appeals" that "it did not consider anything in the files it 
purportedly took judicial notice of." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Newman's claim is 
without merit. Newman bases his argument on a comment made by the district 
court during the hearing regarding a preliminary hearing transcript -- that 
although it would take judicial notice of the transcript being prepared or filed such 
judicial notice does not "necessarily" mean that the judge would consider as fact 
the contents of the document. (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Newman's argument is 
baseless. The district court explicitly stated that its decision to deny Newman's 
petition was made after a review of his underlying criminal file and post- 
conviction file. Furthermore, Newman fails to appreciate that it is proper for a 
court to take judicial notice of the existence of court documents and then weigh 
and evaluate the contents of those documents as any other evidence rather than 
accepting the content as judicially noticed fact, 
As an initial matter, Newman's claim that the district court did not consider 
the documents it took judicial notice of is directly contradicted by the record. The 
district court's order clearly states that the court reached its decision after the 
court "reviewed" Newman's original underlying criminal case and his initial post- 
conviction file: 
Having reviewed the Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction 
Relief, the State's Answer, Petitioner's Response to Answer to 
Dismiss Post Conviction Relief, and Petitioner's Post Conviction 
Relief Petition Amendment and the Affidavits of Joseph Newman in 
Support, Petitioner's Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice, the 
original file for Bannock County Case Cr-FE-1998-494-A, and 
accompanying transcripts, and having heard testimony and 
argument on the matter, the Court DENIES Petitioner's request to 
vacate the sentence and judgment of conviction. 
(Memorandum Decision and Order on Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, p.1.) 
Thus, regardless of what the district court may have previously stated with regard 
to what it may or might not do, the record contains a direct statement of what the 
court actually did. Accordingly, Newman's claim is without merit. The district 
court reviewed the document as part of its decision to deny Newman's petition. 
Furthermore, there was nothing improper regarding the district court's 
statement that although it would take judicial notice of the document it would not 
necessarily consider the content of the document as fact: 
I'll take judicial notice of the fact that a preliminary hearing 
transcript was prepared in regard to a preliminary hearing that 
occurred on September 9, 1998. Again, that doesn't necessarily 
mean that I'm going to consider what was in it [as fact]. I'm taking 
notice of the fact that there was one prepared, which is what its all 
about. 
(#35568 Tr., p.24, Ls.7-13.) It makes sense that the court would take judicial 
notice of the filing or creation of the preliminary hearing transcript because such 
facts are "capable of accurate and ready demonstration." See Rule 201(b). 
However, the accuracy of the statements within the transcript is something 
different. The truthfulness of those statements are not taken as judicially noticed 
fact, but rather evidence to be weighed just like any other statement admitted into 
evidence. See One Hour Cleaners v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of State of 
Cola., 914 P.2d 501, 505 (Colo. App. 1995) ("We recognize that a court can take 
judicial notice of its own records and files. However, these documents did not 
state facts that can be judicially noticed under CRE 201. The statements 
supported petitioners' position on the very issue the parties were litigating and do 
not set out facts that are generally known or capable of accurate and ready 
determination as required under CRE 201.") (citing J. Wigmore, Evidence 5 2567 
(1981)); see also Garcia v. Sterling, 221 Cal. Rptr. 349, 352 (Cal. App.1985) 
("Although the existence of statements contained in a deposition transcript filed 
as part of the court record can be judicially noticed, their truth is not subject to 
judicial notice."). Thus, here, it was entirely proper for the district court to take 
judicial notice of court documents but not accept the contents of those 
documents as fact. Accordingly, Newman has failed to show any reversible 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Newman's request to vacate his sentence and judgment of 
conviction. 
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